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Abstract
The rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies is an integral part of the right of 
individuals to bring international claim against a State. This rule is expressly 
required in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the 
Protocol of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Nevertheless, as 
the various types of domestic remedies and the various circumstances in which 
they are pleaded by respondent States are still unfolding, the jurisprudence of 
the African Court is understandably at an infantile stage and continues to 
undergo development and refinement. This short comment examines the view 
of the African Court, following that of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, that non-judicial remedies are not valid remedies that need to 
be exhausted before claims are brought before the African Court by 
individuals. It is argued that this is an unduly wide and indiscriminate 
proposition that would have the effect of unjustifiably excluding administrative 
remedies that may have effectively remedied a breach if approached by 
individuals before coming to the African Court. It was consequently argued 
that there is need for reconsideration now before the view becomes too 
entrenched.
1. Introduction: Overview of the Rule of Exhaustion of 
Domestic Remedies
Every system of international adjudication in which an individual has capacity 
to bring claims against States necessarily interferes with the sovereignty of
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States in two significant ways. First, it denigrates the rule of international law by 
which only States have international law rights of action, inter se, in that an 
obligation of a State to answer to an international claim brought by an 
individual, whether its national or an alien, diminishes the sovereign character 
of a State, an aspect of which is the rule that a State is not compellable to submit 
to arbitral or judicial settlement. Second, it interferes with the reserved domain 
of municipal law by touching on that sensitive part of the bond of nationality 
between a State and its citizens or at the very least, the link of territorial 
jurisdiction between a State and an alien resident within its jurisdiction.
One of the essential elements of the bond of nationality is that, except the 
State otherwise limits its absolute power and jurisdiction over its nationals, no 
other State or international organisation can claim protection over such a 
national for events that occurred within the territory of the State.1 indeed it is 
now a rule of practical relevance, following the notable case of Jurisdiction of 
the Courts of Danzig,2 that a State could confer international law benefits on 
individuals by international agreement. These include both the conferment of 
rights and the capacity on the individual to enforce the rights, not just before the 
courts of an individual’s State of nationality, but also before an international 
court or tribunal having jurisdiction. The existence of such a treaty invariably 
encroaches on the reserved domain of States and necessarily limits the otherwise 
absolute powers of States respecting events occurring within their territories.
In spite of the degree of limitation, however, a State still retains an aspect of 
its sovereignty which it could assert in appropriate circumstances. As rightly 
pointed out by Anzilotti in his Separate opinion in Customs Regime between 
Germany and Austria:1 2 3
The legal conception of independence has nothing to do with a State's 
subordination to international law or with the numerous and constantly 
increasing States of de facto dependence which characterize the relation of 
one country to other countries. It also follows that the restrictions upon a
1 In deference to this, in the Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Services of the 
United Nations, ICJ Rep. 1949, 174, 185, while affirming the right of the United 
Nations to bring international claims to protect its nationals, the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) carefully avoided denigrating the overall rights of the State of nationality 
of an official being protected by the United Nations.
2 Advisory Opinion, Series B, No. 15 (1928) 17 - 18. This rule was seamlessly followed 
by the African Court in the recent case of Frank Omary & Ors. v. Tanzania, 
Application no 001/2012, wherein former employees of the dissolved East African 
Community (before it was later re-established in 1999) where allowed to litigate an 
agreement between Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya before the municipal courts of 
Tanzania.
3 (1931) PCIJ series A/B No. 41, p. 58
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State's liberty, whether arising out of ordinary international law or 
contractual engagements, do not as such in the least affect its independence. 
As long as these restrictions do not place the State under the legal authority 
of another State, the former remains an independent State however 
extensive and burdensome those obligations may be.
In the event of international litigation against a State by individuals, therefore, 
there is always the domestic jurisdiction of a respondent State to be asserted in 
defence to the claim. As a consequence, whenever an additional international 
level of enforcement jurisdiction is created in favour of individuals, primus 
status is accorded to municipal institutions (as the institutions that have the most 
proximate link with the aggrieved individual and the cause of action) over any 
international enforcement mechanism there may be. This primus place is clothed 
in the doctrine of exhaustion of domestic remedies.
This rule of customary international law of antiquity origin was first 
developed in relation to the right of diplomatic protection. It requires that an 
individual whose rights have been violated by a State should first seek remedies 
under the laws of that State as a condition precedent to the individual’s State of 
nationality bringing an international claim on the individual’s behalf. It is thus 
well established in the case law of international courts and tribunals that the 
purpose of the rule is to allow the State to resolve the problem by its internal law 
before being confronted with an international proceeding, and that this is 
particularly true respecting the jurisdiction of international human rights courts, 
because the latter reinforces or complements domestic jurisdiction.4 The reason 
for the rule within the context of diplomatic protection, according to Judge 
Winiarski of the ICJ, is to enable a State in which the rights of a foreign national 
are alleged to have been injured in breach of international law to provide a 
remedy by its own means within the framework of its own laws.5
The requirement for aliens, who have no bond of nationality with a 
defaulting State to exhaust the domestic remedies available in the State before 
the alien’s State of nationality could exercise diplomatic protection on the
4 Velasquez v. Honduras, Judgment of July 29 1988, Series C No 4, para 61; Emanuel 
Mjawasi& 748 Ors v. The Attorney General of the Republic of Kenya, Application 
009/2011, para 34 (holding that “[t]he rule is to the effect that a state should be given 
an opportunity to address an alleged wrong within the framework of its own domestic 
legal system before its international responsibility can be called into question’); also 
see William Campbell & Ors v. The Republic of Zimbabwe Case No SACDT: 03/2009 
of June 5, 2009, para 26; Candedo Trinidade, The Application of the Rule of 
Exhaustion of Local Remedies in International Law: Its Rationale in the International 
Protection of Individual Rights, Cambridge University Press, 1983, p. 1
5 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Winiarski in Interhandel case (Switzerland v. United 
States of America) ICJ Rep 1959, 6, 83
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alien’s behalf, emphasizes the general inexcusable character of the rule of 
exhaustion of domestic remedies in respect of international claims by 
individuals against their State of nationality. The rule is however subject to 
several exceptions.
The emergence of, and indeed the proliferation of international courts in 
which individuals could sue their States of nationality and even third States has 
given more usage to the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies as much as it 
has given rise to the temptation to diminish its application. This is even as it has 
become the consistent view of some international tribunals that they are not 
bound by the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies even respecting a claim 
brought under the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (hereafter 
African Charter).6 Such a view is not only an arrogation of a power essentially 
reserved in the territorial State, absent the recognised exceptions under 
international law, it also alienates the international human rights court and its 
eventual judgment from the institutions of the territorial State.7 This is of 
particular importance as the implementation of the judgments of international 
human rights courts usually rests upon the legal structures of the respondent 
State.
The rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies is contained in article 56(5) of 
the African Charter and article 6(2) of the Protocol of African Court on Human 
and Peoples’ Right (Hereafter, the African Court). It is thus one of the 
conditions to be fulfilled before an individual can bring an international right 
action under the Charter, and more so, before the African Court. Though the 
African Court faithfully adheres to the requirement and had declared several 
cases inadmissible on account of failure to exhaust domestic remedies, but as 
the recent case of Tanganyika Law Society & anor v. Tanzania8 manifestly 
shows, the African Court, as does the African Commission, has been failing to 
give full effect to the rule in one important respect. This assertion is based on 
the recurrent view of the African Court that the domestic remedies needed to be 
exhausted are judicial remedies to the exclusion of remedies of political or 
administrative nature.
This comment challenges that position and argues that the view of the Court 
is not in keeping with the position of international law as established by
6 See Amos O Enabulele (2012), ‘Sailing Against the Tide: Exhaustion of Domestic 
Remedies and the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice’, 56(2) Journal of African 
Law, 268
7 Amos O Enabulele (2010), “Reflections on the ECOWAS Community Court Protocol 
and the Constitutions of Member States” 12 International Community Law Journal, 
11
8 Application 009/2011. This case was consolidated with Mtikila v. Tanzania 
application, No 011/2011
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international courts and tribunals. In holding this view, however, the writers 
consider that it will be easier for an international court to find that there are 
indeed no remedies to be exhausted by an individual, when the remedies, being 
administrative or political, are predominantly discretionary. Nevertheless, the 
writers hold the firm view that it does not follow from that position that 
administrative or political remedies do not count as exhaustible domestic 
remedies in all circumstances.
2. Tanganyika Law Society & Anor v. Tanzania
In the case, the Tanganyika Law Society and Rev. Mtikila brought separate 
applications before the African Court on the claim that Tanzania had, through 
certain amendments to its Constitution, violated its citizens’ right of association, 
the right to participate in public/governmental affairs, among others. The 
applications were later consolidated. The main grouse of the second applicant 
was the Eight Constitutional Act, by which the Constitution of Tanzania was 
amended to make it mandatory for an electoral candidate to be a member of, and 
be sponsored by a political party and thus prohibiting independent candidacy.
Following this amendment, the 2nd applicant filed a case in the High Court of 
Tanzania, challenging the amendment on the ground that it conflicted with the 
Constitution of Tanzania. The Court held in his favour and declared the 
amendment which sought to bar independent candidacy null and void. 
Meanwhile, the government continued to pursue its desire to exclude 
independent candidacy by seeking to nullify the right of independent candidates 
to contest elections by a new proposal for constitutional amendment - the 
eleventh amendment. By this amendment, which was eventually passed by the 
legislature and assented to by the President, the High Court judgment was made 
nugatory.
In consequence, the 2nd Applicant commenced another suit at the High Court 
on the ground that the amendment yet violated the Constitution. The High Court 
found in his favour, holding that the impugned amendment violated the 
democratic principles and the doctrine of basic structures enshrined in the 
Constitution. On appeal to the Court of Appeal by the respondent, the High 
Court judgment was reversed in favour of the amendment banning independent 
candidature.
In its judgment, the Court of Appeal held that the matter was a political 
matter that should be resolved by Parliament. As a result, Parliament began a 
consultative process aimed at obtaining the views of the citizens of Tanzania on 
the possible amendment to the Constitution. This process was still ongoing by 
the time the case before the African Court was decided. The prevailing 
constitutional order in Tanzania by the time this case was decided by the 
African Court barred independent candidature.
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At the African Court, the applicants prayed the Court to declare that 
Tanzania was in violation of articles 2 and 13(1) of the African Charter and 
articles 3 and 25 of the Interantional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
They urged the Court to direct the Respondent to put the necessary 
constitutional, legislative and other measures in place to give effects to the 
rights contained in the aforementioned provisions and to report to the Court 
within a 12 month period. The 2ndAppellant prayed the Court to specifcally find 
that his right had continuously been violated.
In response to the claim, the Respondent raised a preliminary objection 
challenging the admissibility of the claim on the ground that domestic remedies 
had not been exhausted. The respondent based its argument on the judgment of 
theTanzanian Court of Appeal, which directed that the matter be settled by 
Parliament, and argued that the processes initiated by Parliament towards this 
end were still ongoing.
On their part, the Respondents contended that constitutional amendment did 
not constitute a viable remedy within the contemplation of the rule of exhaustion 
and that what constitutes viable remedies to be exhausted are judicial remedies. 
In its ruling, the Court began by noting that the remedies envisaged by the 
combined reading of articles 6(2) of its Protocol and 55 of the Charter are 
primarily judicial remedies as they are the ones that meet the criteria of 
availability, effectiveness and sufficiency.9 The Court further held that human 
rights jurisprudence equates the term “local [domestic] remedies” with judicial 
remedies.10
Accordingly, the Court held that the 2nd appellant exhasuted domestic 
remedies since the matter had been decided by the Court of Appeal, which is the 
final Court in Tanzania.11In the reasoning of the Court:
The parliamentary process, which the respondent states should also be 
exhausted is a political process and is not an available, effective and 
sufficient remedy because it is not freely accessibile to each and every 
individual; it is discretionary and may be abandoned anytime. No matter 
how democratic the parliamentary process will be, it cannot be equated to 
an independent judicial process for the vindication of the rights under the 
charter. In conclusion, we find that the applicants have exhausted local 
remedies....12
Though the decision of the Court that there were no viable remedies left 
unexhausted is unassailable in the circumstances of the case, the reasoning upon
9 Id, para 82.1
10 Id, para 82.3
11 Id, para 82.2
12 Id, para 82.3
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which that decision was based is untenable and remains to be demonstrated in 
international jurisprudence on the point in the light of the discussion below.
3. Domestic Remedies is not Limited to Judicial Remedies
It is indeed difficult to agree with the Court that viable domestic remedies are 
limited to judicial remedies. It is even more difficult to agree with the Court that 
this view, as the Court consistently claimed, represents the established 
international jurisprudence on the point. In any event, the reasoning of the Court 
went beyond the bounds of what was necessary to deal with the claim of in­
exhaustion raised in the case, in that, it was completely possible for the Court to 
have reached the same conclusion given that the unexhausted domestic remedies 
in Tanzania were actually not viable. To all intent and purposes, the so called 
parliamentary consultation was never intended to yield any result in time for it 
to be useful to the 2nd respondent. After all, it was the same Parliament that 
reversed the decision of the High Court via constitutional amendment. It was 
thus credible for the African Court to have simply relied on the obvious fact that 
the parliament was already an interested party that could not have acted in good 
faith in the entire process without seeking to discredit all administrative or 
political remedies that a State party may genuinely put in place to deal with 
specific breaches.
In any event, the parliamentary procedure was not a preexisting remedy; it 
was rather a product of the order of the Court of Appeal. In a technical sense, 
the case before the African Court was in effect an appeal against the decision of 
the Tanzania Court of Appeal. This is even more convincing when seen in the 
light of the eventual decision of the African Court, which in overruling Court of 
Appeal, restored the view earlier taken by the High Courts.
It is pertinent to note at this point that the view of the African Court is not an 
isolated interpretation of the exhaustion provision of the Charter as it has been 
the recurrent view of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
that only judicial remedies are viable for the purpose of the exhaustion rule. In 
Constitutional Rights Project v. Nigeria,13 it was shown that a conviction 
rendered by a Special Armed Robbery Tribunal which the complaint before the 
Commission was against was subject to the power of the Governor of a State to 
confirm or reject. Moreover, the judgment of the Tribunal was not subject to 
judicial review. Based on this, Nigeria had argued that the complainant should 
not be held to have exhausted domestic remedies until the Governor exercised 
this power either way. The Commission held that the remedy, being 
discretionary and not of a judicial character, was not viable and effective. In
13 Communication 60/91
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Adocat Sans Frontieres (on behalf of Bwampanye) v. Burundi,1 the 
Commission held that the failure to seek to be pardoned by the relevant 
authority did not violate the rule of exhaustion, as pardon, not being judicial 
remedy, was ineffective. The same view was held in Amnesty International v. 
Sudan, wherein the Commission demanded the exhaustion “...of all internal 
remedies, if any, if they are of judicial nature, are effective and are not 
subordinated to the discretionary power of public authorities”.15
while it may be true that judicial remedies are the most viable remedies, it 
does not mean that non-judicial remedies should be completely foreclosed, nor 
does it mean that judicial remedies are effective in all circumstances. The goal 
of the exhaustion rule should always be towards allowing a State to resolve a 
matter by means of its own choosing, provided the choice of remedy relates to 
the breaches alleged and are available, accessible, effective and sufficient, not 
only in theory but also in practice.16 It is thus incumbent upon a court assessing 
in-exhaustion of domestic remedies to consider the end the domestic remedies 
pleaded before it are ultimately intended to serve, irrespective of whether the 
remedies are of a judicial, political or administrative character. it may well 
happen, particularly in a majority of African States, where the judicial process is 
slow, costly and cumbersome, that an administrative or political solution 
adopted for the purpose of resolving issues of the nature submitted to an 
international court may be more viable than judicial remedies.
This is even so as there is settled international jurisprudence on the point that 
domestic remedies are not effective simply because they are of a judicial nature. 
In Akdivar v. Turkey,17 for instance, the remedies that were found not to be 
viable were of judicial nature before administrative courts. in Media Rights 
Agenda v. Nigeria,18 by reason of the failure of the then Military Government in 
Nigeria to obey a decision of a High Court which nullified a Decree, the 
Commission held that judicial remedies were ineffective as the failure to obey 
the court order was seen as “a dramatic illustration of the futility of seeking a 
remedy from Nigerian courts”. In effect, judicial remedies would be held not to 
be valid remedies where it is shown that the government is in the habit of 
disobeying court judgments. 14 15 16 17 18
14 Communication 231/99
15 Communications 48/90, 52/91 & 89/93
16 De Jong, Baljet& van den Brink v. Netherlands (1984) 8 EHRR 20, 38; Vernillo v. 
France, 20 February 1991, Series A no. 198, pp. 11-12, 27; Akdivar and Others v. 
TurkeyApplication no. 21893/93, para 66; Dalia v. France, 19 February
1998, Reports 1998-I, 87-88, para 38)
17 Ibid.
18 Communication 102/93, para 50-51.
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It thus defies judicial economy to dismiss a remedy, simply because it is not 
of a judicial nature, when in actual fact, the remedy is capable of resolving the 
complaint with minimal delay. It also unduly encroaches on the right of a State 
to determine the means by which conflicting claims and interests are resolved 
within its municipality. It is the writers’ considered view that as “it is not 
entirely sufficient for a claimant to merely allege that the available remedies are 
futile without having made an attempt to exhaust them”,19 20 so is it not sufficient 
for an international court to dismiss a domestic remedy on the basis of a 
preconceived distinction between judicial and non-judicial remedies.
The futility of such approach was shown in Egyptian Initiative for Personal 
Rights andINTERIGHTS v Egypt,20 which came before the African Commission. 
Here, the Commission was willing to accept that police inquiry into sexual 
violence against the victims of the crime constituted domestic remedies to be 
exhausted, if the inquiry had not been stopped. The Commission noted that the 
decision not to prosecute, as well as the confirmation of that decision, following 
the Victims’ appeal, is sufficient evidence that the conditions for the exhaustion 
of domestic remedies had been met, as the Victims were left with no other 
remedy because the inquiry procedures had been stopped.21 Furthermore, the 
Commission declared:
It is the African Commission’s view that the Respondent State’s submission 
on the temporary halt of inquiry procedures cannot justify the reason why 
Victims should be left without any recourse until a potential reopening of a 
matter, following new evidence. The African Commission notes that 
eighteen (18) months have passed since the alleged violations occurred and 
probabilities for the inquiry to be re-opened are slim since evidence has 
already been gathered and examined. The Respondent State, also did not 
supply the African Commission with any evidence that it has instituted 
actions to find the new evidence.22
What this confirms, is that investigation, a non-judicial remedy, being an 
obligation upon a State, constitutes legitimate expectation in the minds of 
individuals, and is therefore a domestic remedy to be exhausted. This view is 
reinforced by Tanrikulu v. Turkey, wherein the European Court of Human 
Rights (hereafter “ECtHR) held that the Turkish government was in breach of 
the right to life of the deceased for failure to effectively investigate the cause of
19 Henry Onoria (2003), “The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and 
the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies Under the African Charter” African Human 
Rights Law Journal 13 (2003)
20 Communication 323/06
21 Id, para 65
22 Id, para 66
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death.23 The existence of a duty to investigate on the part of a State invariably 
eventuates into a corresponding duty on an applicant to submit to investigative 
procedures in fulfilment of exhaustion requirement prior to seising an 
international court, except where evidence shows that the procedure was not 
accessible by the plaintiff or that it was unduly prolonged. The fact that it is not 
a judicial remedy does not discharge the complainant from exhausting that 
remedy as a first step towards obtaining redress in line with the laws of the 
respondent State. Nor does it give an international court the faculty to question 
the mode of redress available in the respondent State without proof by evidence 
that the mode of redress is actually not suitable to redressing the legal wrong. A 
State party to an international human rights instrument assumes an obligation of 
result which may be in form of prevention or satisfaction. it is absolutely the 
province of the State to determine what measures best give effect to its 
obligations. This view is in tandem with article 1 of the African Charter, by 
which:
The Member States of the Organization of African Unity parties to the 
present Charter shall recognize the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in 
this Chapter and shall undertake to adopt legislative or other measures to 
give effect to them.
This provision has been variously espoused by the African commission without 
a single case in which it has been restricted to implementation only by way of 
judicial remedies. In Association of Victims of Post Electoral Violence & 
Interights v. Cameroon,24 the African Commission declared that article 1 
imposes an obligation of result and not just of diligence. This was to the effect 
that a State cannot be discharged of its obligation under the Charter by showing 
that it had exercised diligence in the protection of human rights if the diligence 
did not in fact prevent human rights abuses. Accordingly:
... the obligations which ensue from Article 1 impose on the State of 
Cameroon the need to implement all the measures required to produce the 
result of protecting the individuals living on its territory. The use of the 
legal, technical, human and material resources that the State of Cameroon 
claims to have did not produce the expected result, namely that of 
guaranteeing the protection of human rights.25
The Commission also stated that article 1 imposes on the State parties to the 
Charter, the need to put in place, within their territories, all measures conducive 
to producing the result of preventing all violations of the African Charter,
23 Application No. 23763/94 of July 8, 1999
24 Communication 272/03
25 Ibid, para 115
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irrespective of whether the violations are committed by a machinery of the State 
itself or by non-State actors.26 In Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v. 
Zimbabwe, the Commission made it clear that the crust of the African Charter 
obligation is to ensure that any person whose right is violated would have an 
effective and enforceable remedy.27 In the writers’ view, enforceable remedies 
are not limited to judicial remedy. A political or administrative remedy properly 
determined is enforceable.
Also relevant here is the decision of the ICJ in Avena and Other Mexican 
Nationals.28 In this case, Mexico brought an Application instituting proceedings 
against the United States of America for "violations of the Vienna Convention 
on Consular Relations" of 24 April 1963, allegedly committed by the United 
States.
Mexico claimed that the United States, in arresting, detaining, trying, 
convicting, and sentencing 54 Mexican nationals to death, violated its 
international legal obligations to Mexico. This claim was made in its own right 
and in the exercise of its right of consular protection over its nationals, as 
provided for under articles 5 and 36, respectively of the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations (VCCR). As a consequence, Mexico claimed, inter alia, 
restitutio in integrum and restoration of status quo ante, by re-establishing the 
situation that existed before the detention, trial, convictions and sentencing of 
Mexico's nationals in violation of the United States’ international legal 
obligations.
In its decision, the ICJ held that the United States was in breach of its 
international obligation towards Mexico under the VCCR. This was for its 
failure to notify the appropriate Mexican consular post without delay of the 
detention of the 49 Mexican nationals and thereby depriving Mexico of the 
right, in a timely fashion, to render the assistance provided for by the VCCR to 
the individuals concerned.29 Accordingly, the court directed that:
...should Mexican nationals nonetheless be sentenced to severe penalties, 
without their rights under ... the Convention having been respected, the 26 27 28 29
26 Id, para 119
27 CommunicationNo.245 (2002), para 171; Communication 251/02, Lawyers of 
Human Rights v. Swaziland, para 61 holding that by ratifying the charter without 
taking appropriate steps to bring its laws in line with the charter, the state failed to 
comply with its obligation under article 1; Communication 241/2001, Purohit Moore 
v. The Gambia, paragraph 43, holding that ‘when a State ratifies the African Charter 
it is obligated to uphold the fundamental rights contained therein. otherwise if the 
reverse were true, the significance of ratifying a human rights treaty would be 
seriously defeated’.
28 (Mexico v.UnitedStates of America'), ICJ Rep. 2004, 12, 36, para 40.
29 Id, p. 71, para 153 (4) and (5).
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United States of America shall provide, by means of its own choosing, 
review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence, so as to allow full 
weight to be given to the violation of the rights set forth in the Convention.30 31 32 33
in line with the decision of the iCJ, the President of the United States, by a 
Memorandum, directed the courts of the States within the US, where the trials 
and convictions took place, to give effect to the iCJ judgment. in the 
consequential proceedings at the Supreme Court of the United States - Jose 
Ernesto Medellin v. Texas31 - it was argued before the court that the President’s 
determination was lawful and binding on the affected States’ courts and that the 
ICJ decision was binding on organs of the US, including the courts of the land. 
In its decision, the Supreme Court was of the firm view that the expression of 
the obligation to comply in article 94(1) of the United Nations Charter (UNC) 
precluded the judicial branch from taking steps to comply and that the phrase, 
“undertake to comply” in article 94(1) of the UNC is simply a commitment by 
member States of the United Nations (UN) to take future actions through their 
political branches to comply with ICJ decisions. The Supreme Court therefore 
declared that the UNC did not vest decisions of the ICJ with immediate legal 
effect in domestic courts.
Sequel to the foregoing, Mexico returned to the ICJ in Request for 
Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case concerning Avena 
and Other Mexican Nationals32 wherein Mexico sought an interpretation of the 
judgment with a view to showing that the failure of the US Supreme Court to 
enforce the judgment of the ICJ in the main Avena case33 was a violation of the 
obligation on the US to comply with the judgment of the Court under article 
94(1) of the UNC. Mexico argued that the United States had an obligation of 
result under paragraph 153(9) of the main judgment and that the United States 
must provide review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentences of the 
Mexican Nationals.34
In its decision, the Court refused to prescribe to the United States a means of 
fulfilling the obligation imposed on it by the judgment of the Court, despite the 
trenchant argument of Mexico towards that end. According to the Court:
The obligation laid down ... is indeed an obligation of result which clearly 
must be performed unconditionally; non-performance of it constitutes 
internationally wrongful conduct. However, the judgment leaves it to the 
United States to choose the means of implementation, not excluding the
30 Id, p. 72, para 153(9)
31 Supreme Court Reporter, Vol. 128, 2008, 1346
32 (Mexico v. United States of America), ICJ Rep, 2009, p. 3
33 Supra, note 28
34 Supra note 32, p. 6, para 9
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introduction within a reasonable time of an appropriate legislation, if 
deemed necessary under domestic constitutional law... .35
The important question to be asked is whether the remedy adopted by the 
respondent State effectively deals with a grievance of the nature brought by the 
applicant. As the Inter-American Court of Human Rights rightly held in 
Velasquez v Honduras, domestic remedies should simply be weighed on the 
basis of their suitability to redressing a legal wrong of the nature before an 
international court. According to the Court:
Adequate domestic remedies are those which are suitable to address an 
infringement of a legal right. A number of remedies exist in the legal system 
of every country, but not all are applicable in every circumstance. If a 
remedy is not adequate in a specific case, it obviously need not be 
exhausted. A norm is meant to have an effect and should not be interpreted 
in such a way as to negate its effect or lead to a result that is manifestly 
absurd or unreasonable. For example, a civil proceeding specifically cited 
by the Government, such as a presumptive finding of death based on 
disappearance, the purpose of which is to allow heirs to dispose of the estate 
of the person presumed deceased or to allow the spouse to remarry, is not an 
adequate remedy for finding a person or for obtaining his liberty.36
The Court further stressed the importance of determining whether a remedy is 
capable of producing the result for which it was designed.37 The test of the 
capability of an existing remedy to produce the expected result does not include 
an expectation that the complaint’s case must be upheld. It is indeed the law that 
the fact that a remedy does not produce a result favourable to the complainant 
does not, in and of itself, demonstrate that domestic remedies are inexistent or 
ineffective.
Contrary to the claim of the African Court that it is well-established in 
international jurisprudence that only judicial remedies are viable remedies for 
the purpose of exhaustion, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) looks beyond 
judicial remedies in determining whether domestic remedies have been 
exhausted. For the avoidance of doubt, in Ahmadou Sadio Diallo, the ICJ 
declared:
The DRC did, it is true, cite the possibility of requesting reconsideration by 
the competent administrative authority . the court nevertheless recalls that, 
while the local remedies that must be exhausted included all remedies of a 
legal nature, judicial redress as well as redress before administrative bodies,
35 Ibid, p. 17, para 44
36 Supra note 4, para 64.
37 Id, para 66.
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administrative remedies can only be taken into consideration for the purpose 
of the local remedies rule if they are aimed at vindicating a right and not at 
obtaining a favour, unless they constitute an essential prerequisite for the 
admissibility of subsequent contentious proceedings. Thus, the possibility 
open to Mr. Diallo of submitting a request for consideration of the expulsion 
decision to the administrative authority having taken it - that is to the prime 
minister - in the hope that he would retract his decision as a matter of grace 
cannot be deemed a local remedy to be exhausted.38
As should be the case, the strength of the approach of the ICJ in this case is in 
the fact that, while leaving the possible remedies that could be relied upon 
seemingly open-ended, the Court carefully inserted the useful proviso that 
completely eradicates non-judicial remedies that are discretional.
In addition to the requirement that a non-judicial remedy must not be 
discretionary in nature, the remedy must by nature be aimed at resolving the 
breach suffered by the applicant. Following the established view of international 
human rights courts, it could be stated that an administrative remedy is not 
viable unless it is aimed at resolving the breach complained of. Indeed, a non­
judicial remedy that merely turns individuals asserting their rights to beggars 
waiting on the magnanimity of a particular individual or authority, or a remedy 
which does not have clear and objective rules governing its outcome, needs not 
be exhausted. Where however a public officer’s discretion is guided by clear 
rules and the remedy is assessable and fitting for dealing with a breach, it should 
be mandatory for an applicant to exhaust it.
4. Conclusion
The narrow but salient point this case comment set out to address was the 
blanket exclusion of non-judicial remedies from the class of domestic remedies 
mandatory to be fulfilled by an applicant before siesing the African Court. The 
writers have argued that though the Court was right to have held that there were 
no viable domestic remedies to be exhausted by the applicants in this case, the 
Court had no basis for declaring that only judicial remedies are required to be 
exhausted by applicants.
It is therefore the writers’ considered view that it is essential for the Court to 
jettison the view that non-judicial remedies are not viable and thus need not to 
be exhausted to enable it assess domestic remedies within the context of each 
case and on the merit. This would be of benefit to the Court, the respondent 
State, and more so, the complainant who avoids being locked in a long and
38 (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo) (Preliminary Objection), 
ICJ Rep 2007, 582, 601, para. 47
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costly litigation for what he or she could possibly have got through a remedy, 
albeit non-judicial, put in place by the respondent State.
Indeed, the African Court immensely benefits from the jurisprudence of older 
international human rights courts that complement municipal law in human 
rights protection. The ECtHR, in particular, has been able to settle its 
jurisprudence on this point, maintaining the right balance to be struck between 
the need to provide effective remedies to individuals and the need to respect 
domestic competences. Like the African Court, the European Court is bound by 
the exhaustion rule, and it has espoused the rule in its jurisprudence. The policy 
consideration of the ECtHR in its approach towards exhaustion is the 
acknowledgement that the machinery of protection established by the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom is subsidiary to the 
national systems safeguarding human rights.39 Accordingly, it primarily aims at 
affording the Contracting States the opportunity of preventing or putting right a 
violation alleged against them before the allegation is submitted to Court.40 In 
this regard, the Court is not fixated on judicial remedies. Indeed as clearly stated 
by the Court in Cardot v. France,4 what is required is for the complainant to 
have made the complaint - at least in substance - to the appropriate domestic 
body, and in compliance with the formal requirements and time-limits laid down 
in domestic law.
The Court has been unequivocal in stating that the application of this rule 
must make due allowance for the context and that in reviewing whether the rule 
has been observed, it is essential to have regard to the particular circumstances 
of the individual case. This, according to the Court, means, amongst other 
things, that the Court must take realistic account not only of the existence of 
formal remedies in the legal system of the Contracting Party concerned but also 
of the general legal and political context in which they operate as well as the 
personal circumstances of the applicants.42 The methods of the ECtHR towards 
the exhaustion rule are therefore recommended to the African Court. ___________■
39 See the Handyside v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 7 December 1976, Series A 
no. 24, p. 22, para 48
40 Hentrich v. France, Judgment of 22 September 1994, Series A no. 296-A, p. 18, para 
33, and Remli v. France judgment of 23 April 1996, Reports 1996-II, p. 571, para 33
41 Judgment of 19 March 1991, Series A no. 200, p. 18, para 34
42 Van Oosterwijck v. Belgium, Judgment of 6 November 1980, Series A no. 40, pp. 17­
18, para 69; Akdivar’s case para 69
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